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Abstract
Violence against union members in Colombia has been at the center of a debate for
several years now. Union leaders and NGOs in Colombia and abroad continuously
argue that free trade agreements with Colombia should be blocked based on the
failure of the current Colombian government to protect union members from targeted
killings. We ﬁrst look at the evolution over time of the indicators for violence against
union members and union leaders. In particular we show (using diﬀerent indicators
and data sources) that violence against unionists in Colombia has shown a signiﬁcant
decline over the last seven years. Then, we use available panel data to study the
determinants of violence against union members and union leaders. We make special
emphasis on testing the claim that a greater intensity in the characteristic activities of
unions (such as strikes, wage negotiations, etc.) leads to more violence against union
members and union leaders. Using diﬀerent data sets, data sources and estimation
methods, we ﬁnd no statistical evidence supporting this claim. These results suggest
that, on average, violence against unionists in Colombia is neither systematic nor
targeted.
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11 Introduction
Violence against union members and union leaders has been at the center of a debate
in Colombia and in countries currently negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with
Colombia. In particular, NGOs and union leaders in Colombia, Europe, Canada, and the
U . S .p e r s i s t e n t l ya r g u et h a tF T A sw i t hC o l o m b i as h o u l db eb l o c k e db e c a u s et h e r ea r en o
results to be seen from attempts by the current Colombian Government to halt violence
against union members. Furthermore, a recent report by an NGO claims that “Most of the
violence against trade unionists is a result of the victims normal union activities. While
the Colombian government claims that most of the violence against trade unions is a by-
product of the armed conﬂict, the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a respected NGO that
provides training and support to the Colombian labor movement, says that the majority
o ft h ea n t i - u n i o nv i o l e n c et h a tt a k e sp l a c ei nC o l o m b i ai si nr e s p o n s et ot h ev i c t i m s ’n o r -
mal union activities...” (see USLEAP, 2008). Union leaders, on their part, have argued
that under the current administration homicides of union members have increased. For
instance, in a recent letter to the Permanent Representatives of the EU Member States,
John Monks, the General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC),
argues that “assassinations of trade unionists in Colombia continue at a rate unseen in
any other country... The country’s main trade union confederations, the Central Unitaria
de Trabajadores (CUT) [Central Union of Workers], the Confederación General del Tra-
bajo (CGT) [General Confederation of Labour], and the Confederación de Trabajadores
de Colombia (CTC) [Confederation of Workers of Colombia] are alerting us and providing
documentation that refutes claims by the Uribe Government that the situation is under
control.” He then asks the representatives to “call a halt to the FTA negotiation... and
so make it clear to the Colombian authorities that the EU and its Member States do not
condone the current situation in Colombia...” The topic of violence against union members
in Colombia even reached the debates in the previous U.S. presidential campaign. More
precisely, in a debate in New York, President Obama pointed to abuses in Colombia as
the reason for his opposition to the FTA with Colombia, including labor leaders he said
are being targets for assassination on a consistent basis.1 On its part, the Colombian gov-
ernment defends itself, explaining that huge eﬀorts have been made in order to protect
unionists. During President Uribe’s speech last year responding to a message sent by a
U.S. congressman, he argued that there were 6,000 people in Colombia receiving personal
protection. Of these, a fourth of them (1,500) were union members. And so the debate
goes on, with many points of view contributing to the discussions, while FTAs continue to
be blocked.
1See voanews.com (2008), and beaconbroadside.com (2008).
2Despite the serious claims used to block economic reforms, the (abundant) available
evidence is rarely used to support these allegations. What are the speciﬁc indicators for
violence against union members in Colombia? How do they compare with other countries
in the region? Has there been any progress in solving this problem? Can killings of union
members in Colombia be explained by their involvement in union activities?
This paper ﬁrst presents the main stylized facts on violence against union members
in Colombia, comparing them with the evolution of the total homicide rate and with the
homicide rate for other groups identiﬁed as vulnerable (journalists, councilmen, mayors,
and teachers). We also compare the level of violence against unionists in Colombia with
that for other Latin American countries. Then, using panel data evidence for Colombia at
the State level from 2000 to 2008, we test the claim that union activities (wage agreements
and negotiations, strikes, work stoppages, street marches, etc.) help explain the levels of
violence against union members in Colombia. In other words, testing this hypothesis is a
ﬁrst step towards knowing whether (on average) union members in Colombia are targeted
and killed because of their involvement in union activities, or, conversely, that unionism is
a dangerous activity in Colombia in that union membership increases the chances of being
a target of violence. Should this hypothesis be proved wrong, however, would suggest
that the argument being used to block economic reforms such as the FTAs with the U.S.,
Canada and Europe is not supported by the available evidence.
Using diﬀerent data sources and indicators we show that there has been a remarkable
decrease in homicides (both in absolute numbers and in terms of the homicide rate) of
union members in Colombia during the last nine years. Furthermore, we show that the
decrease in homicides of union members is larger when one uses the data reported by
the unions’ NGO - Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) - than when one uses government
data. Furthermore, the decrease in homicides against union members has been steeper
than the reduction observed in the total homicide rate for Colombia and in the rate for
other vulnerable groups (teachers, journalists, mayors and councilmen). Despite the large
reduction in the levels of violence against union members in Colombia, the country still
r a n k sv e r yh i g hw h e nc o m p a r e dt oo t h e rc o u n t r i e si nL a t i nA m e r i c aa n dt h ew o r l d .W h e n
analyzing the determinants of union member homicides, we ﬁnd no evidence supporting
the hypothesis that the homicide rate for union members can be explained by involvement
in union activities, such as the unionization rate, wage agreements and negotiations, or
work stoppages and strikes. In other words, using the available information we don’t ﬁnd
evidence supporting the main argument that has been used by union members in Colombia
and abroad, which states that union members are being systematically killed because of
their involvement in union activities. While this result by no means denies the possibility
3that there may be individual cases of targeted killings and targeted violence against union
members, this situation is in no way generalized, nor is it valid to use the argument of
generalized violence against union members to block economic reforms such as FTAs.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, on policy grounds, this paper con-
tributes to a heated debate about the degree, evolution over time, and determinants of
violence against trade union members in Colombia. Second, on academic grounds, this
paper contributes to the existing literature on the economics of crime pioneered by the
seminal works of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1996) and to the empirical literature studying
the determinants of crime (see Fajnzylber et al., 1998; Levitt, 1999; Gaviria and Pages,
2002; Bushway and Reuter, 2008; and Di Tella et al., 2009, among others). While there is
some academic literature on targeted violence against civilians in civil wars (Azam and Ho-
eﬄer, 2002; Kalyvas, 2006; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Vargas, 2009), and sociological studies
about targeted violence against homosexuals (Herek and Berril, 1992; Jenness, 1995), this
paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁr s to n ei nt h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r eo nc r i m et o
assess whether the inherent characteristics (activities) of a given group in the population
is an important determinant of violence against its members.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides some measures of the importance
of unions in the Colombian economy and compares the unionization rate in Colombia with
that for other countries in Latin America. Also, this section presents the main stylized
facts related to the evolution of diﬀerent indicators of violence against union members
in Colombia and describes some of the measures taken by the Colombian government to
confront this problem. Section three presents a thorough description of the data used in
the empirical exercise and explains the empirical strategy; section four presents the main
results and robustness checks. Finally, section ﬁve contains the concluding remarks.
2 Stylized Facts and Data
The ENS reports that the total number of unionized workers in Colombia is about 810,000
for 2009. However, according to the census conducted by the three confederation of workers
in Colombia and directly reported to the Ministry of Social Protection by the Unions, the
total number of unionists in Colombia is about 1.4 million (data for 2008)2. If one takes the
ﬁgure from the ENS, the unionization rate in Colombia is about 4.1%, whereas the ﬁgure
is about 7% if one uses the data from the Unions’ census3. Compared to other countries in
2As the diﬀerence in the two ﬁgures suggest, there is an unsolved debate between the Unions and the
Colombian government regarding the total number of unionized workers in Colombia.
3From now on, we will use the ﬁgures provided by the ENS, as this dataset is available for all years that
this study covers.
4the region, Colombia has a relatively low unionization rate. For instance, the unionization
rate in Venezuela is about 11%, is 7% in Peru, 11.2% in Mexico, 13% in Uruguay, 3% in
Guatemala, and 1% in Ecuador4.
Figure 1 shows the evolution over time in the number of union member homicides in
Colombia for the 1986-2008 period, as reported by the Escuela Nacional Sindical - ENS
(National Union School) (A), and the ratio between union member homicides and total
homicides in Colombia.
As can be observed in panel (A) of Figure 1, murders of unionists increased steadily
between 1986 and the mid-nineties, with a peak of 274 unionists murdered in 1996. During
the second half of the nineties, the number again increased until 2002, when it began to fall
steadily all the way to the latest data in 2009. Panel (B) shows the ratio between union
homicides and total homicides in Colombia for the same time period. It demonstrates that
although total homicides have been reduced every year since 2003 when they were at a
peak of 28,800, the number of homicides of unionists fell at a steeper rate than the number
of total homicides in Colombia.
[INSERT Figure 1 here]
The more traditional way to look at statistics on crime is to focus on the homicide rate,
deﬁned as the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 2 shows the evolution
in the number of homicides in Colombia per 100,000 inhabitants in panel (A) and the
number of homicides of unionists per 100,000 unionists in panel (B). It must be stressed
that the ﬁgures used for homicides of unionists were taken from ENS documents and not
from the ﬁgures the Government handles on union homicides. In other words, this indicator
for union homicides uses the total number reported by the ENS for the 1995 to 2009 time
period for both murders and for the number of individuals aﬃliated in trade unions in
Colombia. The rate for union homicides in 2009 was 5.9. The rate for the total population
was 35 in the same year. In other words, the homicide rate for the total population is 6
times larger than the homicide rate for individuals aﬃliated in unions in Colombia. To see
this clearly, note the diﬀerence in scale for the two panels in Figure 2. The union homicide
rate in 2007 (4.7) was the lowest since 1986 (the ﬁrst year data was recorded). This rate of
5.9 per 100,000 unionists is equal to the homicide rate for the total population in countries
such as the U.S. and Uruguay during 2009.
[INSERT Figure 2 here]
Both homicide rates, union and general, have been signiﬁcantly reduced in Colombia.
B u tt h eu n i o nh o m i c i d er a t eh a sr e s p o n d e dm o r eq u i c k l yt h a nt h er a t ef o rt h et o t a lp o p u -
lation. This can be seen in Figure 3, where the ratio between the union member homicide
4See Newunionism (2010). Available at: http://www.newunionism.net/State_of_the_Unions.htm
5rate and the total rate is presented. As can be seen in this Figure, the homicide rate for
unionists as a percentage of the homicide rate for the total population has been decreasing
since 2001. In other words, progress in reducing union homicides has been greater than
progress in reducing homicides in the general population.
[INSERT Figure 3 here]
Data from the Oﬃce of the Vice President conﬁr m st h em i d - t e r mt r e n do b s e r v e di nt h e
ENS-reported homicides of union members (see Oﬃce of the Vice President, 2009). This
Oﬃce uses the ﬁgures from the Observatory of Human Rights, which are lower than the
ENS ﬁg u r e s ,b u tt h em i d - t e r mt r e n di st h es a m e . F o re x a m p l e ,F i g u r e4( A )s h o w st h e
ENS union homicide rate and the same rate from the Oﬃce of the Vice President from
2001 to 2009.5 Both data sources show the rate fell between 2001 and 2008. In fact, the
reduction in the union homicide rate is greater with ENS data (see ENS, 2009) than with
the data from the Oﬃce of the Vice-President (2009).
Figure 4 Panel (B) shows the ratio between union homicides and total homicides in
vulnerable groups from 2001 to 2009. As seen, the ﬁgure for union homicides as a percentage
of homicides in vulnerable groups shows a reduction between 2001 and 2003 and then the
ratio remains more or less stable until 2009. This was not, however, because of an increase
in homicides in vulnerable groups. In fact, according to data from the Oﬃce of the Vice
President, total homicides in vulnerable groups went down from 2001 (412 homicides) to
2009 (168 homicides). Once again, union homicides have not only fallen at a steeper
rate than total homicides in Colombia, but also at a steeper rate than homicides in other
vulnerable groups during the period 2001 - 2009.
[INSERT Figure 4 here]
The Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT, the largest trade union confederation in
Colombia) reports data on the number of homicides of union leaders6 between 2000 and
2008 in Colombia. Figure 5 (A) shows the evolution over time in the number of union leader
homicides, and panel (B) shows the ratio between the number of union leader homicides
and the total number of homicides in Colombia. As in the case of homicides of union
members, the number of homicides of union leaders decreased steadily between 2001 and
2007. As can be seen in panel (A), the CUT did not report any homicides of union leaders
during 2006 and 2007, and for 2008 the number of union leader homicides reported was
5For the Oﬃc eo ft h eV i c eP r e s i d e n t ,w ec o n s t r u c tt h eh o m icide rate of union members as the numeber
of homicides of union members reported by this Oﬃce per 100,000 union members, the latter reported by
the ENS.
6The CUT divides the homicides of union members between union activists, members of boards of
directors, and unionized workers. We take the ﬁrst two groups as being part of the group of ‘union
leaders.’
611. Panel (B) shows that the reduction in the number of homicides of union leaders in
Colombia was larger than the reduction in the total homicides between 2000 and 2007.
[INSERT Figure 5 here]
Despite the large reduction in violence against union members observed during the
last nine years, Colombia still ranks as the country with the highest levels of violence
against unionists in the world. According to the International Trade Union Confederation
- ITUC, Colombia is the country with the largest number of trade union homicides (48
in 2009), followed by Guatemala (16), Honduras (12) and Mexico (6). Despite revealing
the same rank, a closer look at original sources in diﬀerent countries reveals that while for
Colombia the ITUC report almost exactly coincides with the ENS report for the last four
years, for other countries such as Venezuela and Guatemala the story is slightly diﬀerent.
Table 1 presents the number of homicides of union members in Colombia, Venezuela and
Guatemala during the last four years, as reported by the ITUC and by the local human
rights agency in each of the three countries.7 As can be seen in this table, while the ITUC
report for Colombia almost exactly coincides with what the ENS reports, for Venezuela
and Guatemala the ITUC report clearly underestimates the levels of violence against union
members in these countries. Given these biases in the ITUC reports for other countries
(and not for Colombia), the ITUC ﬁgures should be handled with care when using their
statistics to construct rankings and each country’s share of violence against union members
in the world.
[INSERT Table 1 here]
The amount of resources allocated to the protection of union members and the number
of union members protected have increased steadily over the last ten years. Figure 6 (A)
shows the evolution over time in the per capita amount of resources allocated (measured in
real Colombian pesos of 2009) to protect union members.8 While in 1999 the Colombian
government invested less that $COP 10,0009 in protection services per union member per
year, by 2008 this amount was more than 10 times larger (about $COP 100,00010 per
union member per year). Panel (B) shows the number of union members with government
protection (per 100,000 union members) for the same time period. In 1999 there were about
10 union members protected for every 100,000 unionists. By 2008 this ﬁgure increased to
7For the case of Colombia the local human rights agency reporting the number of killings of union mem-
bers is the Escuela Nacional Sindical - ENS, for Venezuela the Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción
en Derechos Humanos - PROVEA, and for Guatemala the Movimiento Sindical, Indígena y Campesino
Guatemalteco - MSICG.




7about 250 unionists protected per 100,000 union members (see Ministerio de Interior y
Justicia, 2009).
[INSERT Figure 6 here]
To summarize, the stylized facts provided so far depict a diﬀerent picture from the one
drawn by union leaders to block economic reforms in Colombia. Using either of the available
data sources (ENS, CUT, or the Colombian Government) we observe a continuous decrease
in violence against union members and union leaders in Colombia. Not only has progress
in security been greater for union members and leaders than for the total population, but
it has been greater than for other vulnerable groups. Lastly, the government has steadily
increased the resources allocated to the protection of union members and the number of
union members receiving government protection over the last ten years.
We now turn to the empirical exercise, where we estimate the causal impact of union
activities on the union homicide rate, using data of Colombian States for the years 2000
through 2008.
2 . 1 D a t aU s e di nt h eE m p i r i c a lE x e r c i s e
In order to test the hypothesis that greater union activity causes more homicides of union
members and union leaders, we use a panel that includes data from Colombian States
(political division similar to a State) on violence against union members, violence against
union leaders, diﬀerent types of union activity, the homicide rate for the total population,
per capita income, and proxy variables for both government presence and protection, and
for paramilitary and guerrilla presence. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on the
main data used in the empirical analysis.
2.1.1 Violence Against Union Members and Union Leaders
Since the year 2000, both the union’s NGO - ENS, and the Human Rights Observatory
at the Oﬃce of the Vice President of Colombia have reported the number of homicides of
union members in Colombia per year and per State. Although the two sources diﬀer in
the number of homicides of union members reported, with the ENS ﬁgures being larger,
the evolution over time is very similar in the two sources, as described above (see Figure
4 (A)). The ENS also reports the number of union members in each State.11 We use
t h i si n f o r m a t i o no nt h eh o m i c i d er a t ef o ru n i o nm e m b e r si nC o l o m b i a( f o rb o t hs o u r c e s ) ,
11ENS reports ﬁgures for the number of union members by State every two years. We interpolate using
the average between the available years in order to ﬁll the gaps.
8deﬁned as the number of homicides of unionists per 100,000 unionists.12 This will be our
dependant variable in the empirical exercise. Furthermore, the CUT reports the number
of homicides of union members case by case, indicating whether the victim was a union
activist, a member of a board of directors, or a unionized worker. With this information,
we construct the number of homicides of union leaders and the homicide rate for union
leaders13 by state and year, from 2000 to 2008. This variable will also be used in some
of the empirical exercises as a measure of violence against union members. Yet another
variable that we will use in our robustness checks is the number of reported threats to
union members per 100,000 union members. This variable captures another dimension of
violence against unionists in Colombia which is reported by the ENS by State and year
from 2000 to 2008.
2.1.2 Trade Union Activity
Data is available for diﬀerent types of union activity by State and year between 2000 and
2008. We divide union activity into three types. Type I refers to the unionization rate,
which captures the most basic type of union activity; Type II refers to wage agreements and
pacts between unionized workers and ﬁrms; and Type III refers to active acts of protest
such as strikes, work stoppages, street marches, and hunger strikes. On Type I union
activity, the unionization rate, the ENS reports data on the number of unionized workers
by State and year from 2000 through 2008. With this information and the data on the
active labor force by State and year we construct the unionization rate (the number of
unionized workers as a percentage of the active labor force in each State and year). On
Type II union activity, both the ENS14 and the Ministry of Labor report data on wage
agreements and negotiations between ﬁrms and trade unions. Finally, regarding Type III
union activity, the Ministry of Labor reports data on strikes and work stoppages, and the
ENS reports data on other types of union activity such as street protests, strikes, food
strikes, lawsuits, and marches.
In order to control for the fact that larger States normally have more union members
and thus more union activity of all types, we measure union activity per 100,000 union
members. These will be our direct measures of the intensity of union activity by State
12The homicide rate (the number of homicides per 100,000 individuals, or members of a group) is the
most standard measure used in the academic literature.
13We don’t have estimates on the number of union leaders per State and year. Thus, we deﬁne the
homicide rate of union leaders as the number of homicides of union leaders per 100,000 union members.
If the ratio between union leaders and union members remains relatively constant over time and accross
States, then this normalization is innocuous.
14See ENS (2008a).
9and by year. When we run the empirical exercises we will look at each type of activity
separately and aggregated by type of activity (for each data source).
2.1.3 State Controls
We include additional variables that help us control for other potential determinants of
violence against union members diﬀerent than the intensity of union activity. In particu-
lar, we control for the level of economic development (as measured by GDP per capita),
the general level of violence (as captured by the total homicide rate for each State15), gov-
ernment protection (as proxied by the number of police arrests per 100,000 individuals16),
paramilitary and guerrilla presence (as proxied by the number of paramilitary and guerrilla
attacks on civilians), and for year and State ﬁxed eﬀects.
3E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
In order to test the hypothesis that more intense union activity leads to more violence
against union members, the following is the simplest speciﬁcation that we test:
HRUMs,t = c1 + γUAs,t + βXs,t + εs,t, (1)
where c1 is a constant term; HRUMs,t is the homicide rate of union members17 (deﬁned
as the number of homicides of union members per 100,000 unionists) in State s at time t;
UAs,t is a measure of the intensity of unions’ activity (per union member) in State s at time
t;Xs,t is a set of controls, such as GDP per capita, the total homicide rate, government
protection, guerrilla and paramilitary attacks to civilians, and the interaction of guerrilla
and paramilitary attacks with the measures of each type of union activity for each State s
and year t; ﬁnally, εs,t is an error term.
Under the speciﬁcation in equation 1, γ is our parameter of interest. In particular, this
parameter will provide an estimate of the eﬀect of a greater intensity of union activity (as
measured by the alternative ﬁgures available on diﬀerent types of union actions) on the
degree of violence against union members. If the claim that violence against union members
15When we calculate the total homicide rate, we subtract homicides of union members from the total
homicides in each State and the number of unionists from the total population.
16Unfortunately, the Ministry of Justice in Colombia has only aggregate data on the amount of resources
invested in the protection of union members and does not break it down by State.
17In some of the speciﬁcations that we will test below, we replace the homicide rate of union members,
HRUMs,t, with the homicide rate of union leaders, HRULs,t. Also, in some speciﬁcations we use the
threat rate (the number of reported threats against unionists per 100,000 union members) as an alternative
measure of violence against union members.
10in Colombia is indeed generated by the unionists’ own and characteristic activities, then
parameter γ should turn out to be positive and signiﬁcant when we carry out the empirical
estimation of equation 1. Thus, a positive and signiﬁcant γ would imply that, controlling
for other determinants of violence against union members, a greater intensity of union
a c t i v i t yl e a d st om o r ev i o l e n c ea g a i n s tu n i o n i s t s .
We should note, however, that the speciﬁcation in equation 1 suﬀers from a potential
endogeneity problem18. More precisely, it can easily be argued that the intensity of union
activity (UAs,t) is an endogenous variable, since it could be aﬀected by the degree of
violence against union members. In other words, it is reasonable to think that union activity
m i g h tb ea ﬀected by the degree of violence against union members, since union members
might decrease the intensity of their activities based on fear or increase the intensity when
motivated to protest in response to increased violence. The parameter γ that results from
the direct estimation of equation 1 by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would thus be biased
due to the reverse causality problem just described. As such, the parameter γ estimated
by OLS should only be interpreted as a correlation coeﬃcient between union activity and
violence against union members, and not as a causal eﬀect from the former to the latter.
In order to solve the (potential endogeneity) problem that would arise from the esti-
mation of equation 1 by OLS, we use an Instrumental Variables approach (IV) in order
to solve the potential endogeneity problem. In particular, we instrument the intensity of
union activity using variables that aﬀect union activity but are not simultaneously aﬀected
by the degree of violence against union members. To instrument type I (unionization rate)
and type II union activity (wage agreements and pacts) we use two diﬀerent measures of the
degree of formality of labor markets in the industry (the percentage of full time employees
with open-ended contracts19 and social security payments per capita20). To instrument type
III union activity (strikes, work stoppages, etc.), the type of union activity that expresses
protest, we use two diﬀerent measures of industrial activity (industrial energy consumption
per capita and the number of industry establishments per capita). Our ﬁrst stage regression
will be given by:
UAs,t = c2 + δ1z1s,t + δ2z2s,t + βXs,t + us,t. (2)
Where c2 is a constant term, and z1 and z2 are the set of instruments described above
depending on the type of union activity (I and II). In particular, for the case of type I and
type II union activity, z1s,t is the the proportion of full time employees with an open-ended
contract as a proportion of total population in State s at time t, and z2s,t is the amount
18See Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 4).
19Total number of full time employees with open ended contracts as a percentage of the labor force.
20Total social security payments divided by the total number of inhabitants in each state.
11of social security payments per capita in State s at time t. Both instruments, z1 and z2,
are direct measures of the degree of formality in the labor markets. The intuition for using
measures of formality to instrument type I and type II union activity is straightforward.
A more formal labor market allows workers and union members to better organize them-
selves to unionize and to negotiate wage agreements with ﬁrms. Furthermore, regulation
in Colombia requires a minimum number of workers to form a union. Given the well-
established relationship between ﬁrm size and the degree of formality in the labor market
(see World Bank, 2007), our instrument for type I and II union activity makes perfect
sense.
When instrumenting type I and II union activity, it is important that the measures of
formality in the labor market not be endogenous to our measure of violence against union
members. In other words, that violence against union members does not aﬀect the degree
of formality in the labor market.
When we instrument type III union activity to estimate equation 1, z1s,t is the per capita
industrial consumption of energy in State s at time t,a n dz2s,t is the number of industrial
establishments per capita in State s at time t. The two measures used to instrument type
III union activity capture the intensity of industrial activity by State and year. Again, what
is important here is that homicides of union members do not aﬀect the two measures of
industrial activity and that industrial activity correlates with type III union activity. The
intuition for using industrial activity as an instrument for type III union activity is that
more strikes, work stoppages, etc. stop ﬁrms’ activities and this should be reﬂected in our
two measures of industrial activity. If this intuition is correct, we should ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
negative correlation, ceteris paribus, between our two measures of industrial activity (our
instruments) and type III union activity.
Yet another way to solve the reverse causality problem between violence against union
members and union activity is to estimate equation 1 directly by OLS but including a
lagged value for union activity, UAs,t−1, instead of the current value. This partially solves
the problem of reverse causality, since it would be diﬃcult to argue that union activity is
greater in year t − 1 as a response to more violence against union members in year t.
Although including a lag for union activity instead of the current value partially solves
the reverse causality problem, the IV approach described above is our preferred identi-
ﬁcation strategy, as it takes care of the endogeneity problem, allowing us to isolate the
causal impact, if any, of union activity on violence against union members. However, when
presenting the results of the estimation of equation 1, we will also report the estimation
results using OLS and the OLS estimation that includes the lagged value for union activity.
124 Main Results
4.1 The Eﬀect of Type I Union Activity on Violence Against
Union Members
In this section we use the unionization rate as the ﬁr s ta n dm o s tb a s i cm e a s u r eo fu n i o n
activity. In particular, based on the data reported by the ENS on the number of union-
ists and the active labor force (reported by DANE) by State and year we construct the
unionization rate.
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation 1 when we use the homicide
rate for union members as our dependent variable and the unionization rate as the measure
of union activity. The results reported in Table 3 show that once we control for other
potential determinants of violence against union members, a higher unionization rate does
not aﬀect (positively or negatively) the degree of violence against unionists. This result
is still valid when we use the one year lag for the unionization rate or the IV approach
to isolate the possible causal impact of higher unionization rates on the degree of violence
against union members.
For the results reported in Table 3, we use the percentage of full time employees (number
of full time employes as a percentage of the labor force) to instrument the unionization rate.
Regarding the ﬁrst stage regression results, in Table 3 we only report the p-value of the
F-statistic for excluded instruments in order to show the validity of the instrument used
in the ﬁrst stage regression21. W h e nw eu s et h ep e r c e n t a g eo ff u l lt i m ee m p l o y e e sa sa n
instrument of the unionization rate, the p-value of the F-statistic in the ﬁrst stage is 0.04
(see the bottom right of Table 3), leading us to reject the hypothesis that the instrument
is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage.
4.2 The Eﬀect of Type II Union Activity on Violence Against
Union Members
We now use the data reported by the ENS on wage agreements and pacts to measure
Type II union activity. In particular we construct a measure of the number of wage pacts
and agreements per 100,000 union members (by State and year) and use this variable as
an alternative measure of union activity. Unfortunately, ENS only reports data on wage
agreements and pacts since 2005, so we have a smaller sample in this case.
21The complete ﬁrst stage results for the estimations for the three types of union activity are reported
in Table 6. The ﬁrst stage regressions results associated with Type I union activity are presented in the
ﬁrst two columns of Table 6.
13Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of equation 1 when we use wage agreements
and pacts between ﬁrms and unions as a measure of the intensity of union activity. Using
this alternative measure we don’t ﬁnd empirical evidence suggesting that this particular
type of union activity leads to more violence against union members, even after correcting
for potential endogeneity problems. When we use separately wage agreements and wage
pacts (as reported by ENS) the results just described are maintained and are available upon
request.
I nt h ec a s eo fT y p eI Iu n i o na c t i v i t y ,w eu s eb o t hi n s t r u m e n t s( t h ep e r c e n t a g eo ff u l l
time employees and social security payments per capita) in the ﬁrst stage regression, and
report the p-value for the F-statistic and the p-value of the Hansen test associated with the
ﬁrst stage regression in the bottom right of Table 4. The p-value of the F-test for excluded
instruments in the ﬁrst stage is 0.013. Furthermore, the p-value of the Hansen test in the
ﬁrst stage regression is 0.13, indicating that the instruments used are indeed exogenous.22
Summarizing the results obtained so far, when we use type I and type II union activity
as a measure of the intensity of union actions, we ﬁnd no statistical evidence support-
ing the claim that violence against union members in Colombia can be explained by the
characteristic practices of unions.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Type III Union Activity on Violence Against
Union Members
We will now use the ﬁgures from the Ministry of Labor for the other type of activities that
are characteristic of unions: strikes and work stoppages23 (the type of union activity that
expresses itself as protest). We will ask whether a greater intensity of this type of activity
leads to more violence against union members.
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation of equation 1 when we use the sum of
strikes and work stoppages per 100,000 union members as the measure of the intensity of
union activity. When we don’t control for other potential determinants of the homicide rate
for union members, a greater intensity of this type of union activity leads to more violence
against union members. Furthermore, the eﬀect of strikes and work stoppages becomes
stronger when we use the IV approach to isolate the causal impact of these activities on
our baseline measure of violence against unionists. However, once we control for other
potential determinants (the level of economic development, the level of violence against
22C o l u m s3a n d4i nT a b l e6r e p o r tt h ec o m p l e t eﬁrst stage results when we instrument Type II union
activity.
23The ﬁgures on strikes and work stoppages broken down by State are reported by the Ministry of Labor
from 2000 through 2008.
14the total population, etc.) the positive impact of strikes and work stoppages looses its
statistical signiﬁcance under all speciﬁcations.
In the case of Type III union activity, we use as an instrument in the ﬁrst stage the level
of industrial energy consumption per capita (as a proxy for the level of economic activity);
the p-value of the F-statistic in the ﬁrst stage is 0.044 (see the bottom right in Table 5)24.
Yet again, using active acts of protest as a variable to measure union activity, we don’t
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant causal impact of this activities on the levels of violence against unionists.
Finally, although other variables potentially aﬀecting violence against union members
have the expected sign, they are seldom statistically signiﬁcant. More precisely, a higher
homicide rate for the total population and lower levels of economic development (low levels
of GDP per capita) seem to be correlated with higher levels of violence against union
members. As for guerrilla and paramilitary presence, the results consistently suggest that
while the former has a negative eﬀect on the union members’ homicide rate, the latter has
ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect. However, none of these two variables is statistically signiﬁcant in any of
the estimations. The sign of the coeﬃcient on police arrests is hard to interpret since this
is clearly an endogenous variables and, as such, the coeﬃc i e n ta s s o c i a t e dw i t hi tc a n n o tb e
interpreted as a causal eﬀect on the level of violence against unionists.
In order to check the robustness of the results described thus far, we now turn to
describing a battery of robustness checks that we undertake.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of the results described in the previous section, we replicate
the empirical exercises described above but changing the variable capturing the degree of
violence against union members, changing the sources of information for the number of
homicides of union members, and excluding outliers.
Table 7 reports the results of the estimations when we use alternative measures of
violence against union members and estimate the model for each of the three types of
union activities. More precisely, we use as alternative measures the homicide rate for union
leaders, the homicide rate for unionized workers (excluding leaders), the homicide rate for
unionized teachers, and the threat rate, deﬁned as the number of threats (reported by the
ENS) per 100,000 union members.
This Table shows that none of the three types of union activity has a signiﬁcant causal
impact on the diﬀerent measures that we use to measure the degree of violence against
union members.
24C o l u m s5a n d6i nT a b l e6r e p o r tt h ec o m p l e t eﬁrst stage results when we instrument Type II union
activity.
15Table 8 reports the results of the estimation of equation 1 when we use alternative
sources of information on the number of homicides of union members. Particularly, in
addition to the ENS, the Colombian government and the CUT report their own statistics
on this variable. Using these alternative data sources we, yet again, don’t ﬁnd any eﬀect
of either of the three types of union activity on the homicide rate of union members (as
reported by the Colombian government and the CUT).
We also carried out all the empirical exercises described above using the two measures
of type II union activity separately - wage agreements and wage pacts (as reported by
the ENS), and the two diﬀerent measures of type III union activity - strikes and work
stoppages, separately and again found that all results described above were maintained.
Also, we tested equation 1 using the sum of type I, II and III union activity as our variable
of interest, ﬁnding, yet again, that a greater intensity of the aggregate measure of union
activity does not lead to more violence against union members or union leaders.25 We also
estimate the model in equation 1 excluding the upper and lower tails of the distribution
for the two main variables used in the estimations: violence against unionists and union
activity, ﬁnding that the main result is maintained.
Also, we try non-linear speciﬁcations in order to assess whether the eﬀect of union
activity on union violence is present only for suﬃciently high levels of union activity. The
results of this set of robustness checks, however, do not support this conjecture. More
precisely, the eﬀect of union activity remains not statistically signiﬁcant when we estimate
a non linear speciﬁcations of the econometric model in equation 1. We also try diﬀerent
speciﬁcations where we interact our measures of union activity with GDP per capita and
police arrests, ﬁnding that the main results are maintained26.
Finally, since diﬀerent types of union activities are all likely to be correlated over time
within a state, we try an estimation where we cluster the standard errors at the state level.
However, we should stress that correcting for this type of auto correlation in the error
term would lead to over-rejecting (not under-rejecting) the null hypothesis that a greater
intensity union activity leads to more union violence. As expected, when we cluster the
errors at the state level, the point estimates do not change but the associated standard
errors increase27; thus, the eﬀect of union activity on union violence becomes even less
signiﬁcant once we cluster the error term at the state level.
25Although we have not included the Tables for all the robustness checks just described, they are available
from the authors upon request.
26Although we don´t report the results of this set of robustness checks, they are available from the
authors upon request.
27T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
165 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the evolution and determinants of violence against union members in
Colombia for the 2000 - 2008 period. Using diﬀerent data sources and diﬀerent indicators of
violence against union members we show that, contrary to the claim used by diﬀerent NGOs
and union members (in Colombia and abroad) to block important economic reforms such
as free trade agreements, there has been a signiﬁcant decline of violence against unionists
during the last 8 years. We go one step further and, using panel data for Colombian States
between 2000 and 2008, test the claim that “most of the violence against trade unionists is a
result of the victims normal union activities”.28 Using diﬀerent data sources and estimation
techniques we ﬁnd no statistical evidence supporting this claim.
Complementary evidence to the one presented in this paper shows that out of more than
220 investigations of union member killings handed by the oﬃce of the Attorney General in
Colombia since 2007, only in 18 cases (about 8%) the judicial investigation found a direct
link between the homicide and the victim’s involvement in trade union activities, and in 8
cases (3.6%) found a mixture of involvement in trade union activities and links to illegal
armed groups.
Of course, any murder is a very serious matter and more so when the driving motivation
for the crime is the victim’s ideological or political stance. However, an evaluation of
the progress made in confronting such a serious problem as violence against unionists in
Colombia must necessarily look at the ﬁgures and the statistical evidence, and study speciﬁc
indicators for the results. And this is particularly so if the conclusions of such an assessment
a r et ob eu s e df o rs u c hs i g n i ﬁcant measures as blocking an economic reform.
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(A)                                                                                   (B) 
Union Member Homicides  Number of Union Member Homicides/ 
        1986-2009  Number of Total Homicides  
1986-2009 
   
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), (2009 and 2010); Office of the 




(A)                                                                                   (B) 
        Homicide Rate  Homicide Rate for Union Members 
1995-2009        1995-2009 
(Number of homicides per 100,000 inhab.)                           (Number of homicides per 100,000 unionists) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the National Police (2008 and 2010), Office of the Vice President 




























































































































































































































































Union Member Homicide Rate / Total Homicide Rate 
 1995-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the National Police (2008and 2010), Office of the Vice President 
(2009), DANE, and ENS (2009 and 2010). 
 
Figure 4 
(A)                                                                         (B) 
Unionists’ Homicide Rate in Colombia    Unionists’ Homicides/Total Homicides 
      2001-2009       of Vulnerable Groups in Colombia* 
 2001-2009  
  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Office of the Vice President (2009), and ENS (2009). 
(*) Vulnerable group correspond to: union members, councilmen, journalists, mayors and former mayors, teachers 





































































































































































(A)                                                                         (B) 
        Homicides of union leaders*  Number of Union Leader Homicides/ 
2000-2008        Number  of  Total  Homicides 
2000-2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Central Union of Workers (CUT) (2009); the National Police 
(2008); and Office of the Vice President (2009). 
(*) Union leaders correspond to: member of a board of directors, activist, and treasurer. 
 
Figure 6 
(A)                                                                         (B) 
Amount of Resources Allocated to Protect Unionists   Number of Unionists with Gov. Protection  
1999-2008         1999-2008 
(2009 real $COP)               (Number per 100,000 unionists) 
 
 
























































































































































































Homicides of unionized teachers 
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 Total number of homicides of union members: ITUC vs. Local NGOs 
 
Country  Source  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Colombia  ITUC (a)  78  39  49  48 
   ENS (b)  76  39  49  47 
Venezuela  ITUC (a)  0  0  4  0 
   PROVEA (c,d)   -  53  29  46 
Guatemala  ITUC (a)  0  4  9  16 
    MSICG (e)  1  12  12  16 
ENS= Escuela Nacional Sindical  
ITUC= International Trade Union Confederation 
MSICG=Movimiento Sindical, Indígena y Campesino Guatemalteco 
PROVEA= Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos 
Sources:  
(a) International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) (2007-2009). Annual Survey of violations of trade union 
rights. Available at: http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/; http://survey08.ituc-csi.org/; http://survey09.ituc-csi.org/. 
(b) Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) (2009).   
(c) PROVEA (2008-2009). http://www.derechos.org.ve/informes-anuales/ultimo-informe-anual; 
http://www.derechos.org.ve/informes-anuales/informe-anual-2009 
(d) Crespo, Carlos (2007). Más igualdad y menos libertad.   Venezuela Real, Información y Opinión 17 de 
diciembre de 2007. Available at: http://venezuelareal.zoomblog.com/archivo/2007/12/17/mas-igualdad-y-
menos-libertad.html 









Period Source Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Type I union activity (ENS) #/100,000 labor force
    Unionization rate 191  00-08 ENS 3171 1544 1502 11149
Type II union activity (ENS) #/100,000 unionists 112  05-08 ENS 81 208 0,0 1149
    Wage pacts 112  05-08 ENS 23 93 0,0 656
    Wage agreements 112  05-08 ENS 57 142 0,0 1124
Type III union activity (MPS) #/100,000 unionists 252  00-08 MPS 282 731 0,0 7735
    Work stoppages 252  00-08 MPS 278 731 0,0 7735
    Strikes 252  00-08 MPS 4 13 0,0 137
Union members (ENS) #/100,000 unionists 261  00-08 ENS 28,8 60,0 0,0 561,8
Union leaders (a) 261  00-08 CUT 8,4 37,4 0,0 552,5
Union workers (b) 261  00-08 CUT 22,6 54,1 0,0 561,8
Unionized teachers 261  00-08 MPS 13,2 22,9 0,0 192,4
Threats 261  00-08 ENS 50,3 213,8 0,0 3161,6
Total homicide rate  (excluding union members) #/100,000 inhab. 243  00-08  Police/DANE  54,2 35,1 6,2 194,7
Gross domestic product per capita (GDP pc)(c) COP millon pc 243  00-08 DANE 5,0 4,0 1,4 28,0
Police arrests #/100,000 inhab. 243  00-08 Vice President 12,1 14,7 0,5 98,6
Guerrilla (FARC and ELN) #/100,000 inhab. 243  00-08 Vice President 2,4 3,2 0,0 21,5
Paramilitary (AUC) #/100,000 inhab. 243  00-08 Vice President 0,8 2,0 0,0 16,3
Percentage of full time employees % 100,000 inhab. 212  00-08 DANE 464,2 480,9 1,8 1869,2
Social security payments COP thousand pc 212  00-08 DANE 41,0 40,2 0,1 134,7
Industrial energy consumption  Kw pc 212  00-08 DANE 249,7 237,4 0,2 1166,7
Number of industry establishments # 100,000 inhab. 212  00-08 DANE 11,2 9,6 0,4 43,3
Number of unionists 261  00-08 ENS 29224 63188 178 374997
Population 243  00-08 DANE 1555859 1537496 215979 7155052
Notes:
ENS=Escuela Nacional Sindical (Unions' NGO)
MPS= Ministerio de Protección Social (Ministry of Labor)
CUT= Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia (Central Union of Workers)
DANE = Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas (Nacional Administrative Department of Statistics)
Vice President= Office of the Vicepresident of the  Republic of Colombia
pc = per capita
(a) Activists and members of the board of director
(b) Union workers = non leader union members
(c) The value reported for 2007 is approximated. GDPpc for 2008 is not available. We approximate it using the growth rate from 2006 to 2007 and 2007 GDPpc. 




Violence against union members
Controls 
Attacks to civilians (presence)
Instrumental Variables (d)
25VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type I union activity -0.003*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.030
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.035)
Type I union activity t-1 -0.002*** 0.003
(0.000) (0.004)
Total homicide rate 0.129 0.131 0.094
(0.111) (0.107) (0.109)
GDP pc 0.617 5.854* -10.303
(3.255) (3.241) (13.667)
Police arrests -0.412 -0.270 -0.206
(0.292) (0.213) (0.545)
Guerrilla presence -2.092 -1.063 -18.429
(5.725) (4.161) (16.890)
Paramilitary presence 20.361 6.095 102.645
(18.232) (22.320) (100.712)
Union act*guerrilla presence 0.001 0.007
(0.002) (0.005)
Union act*paramilitary presence -0.005 -0.033
(0.005) (0.033)
Union act t-1*guerrilla presence 0.000
(0.001)
Union act t-1*paramilitary presence -0.000
(0.007)
Constant 27.693*** 4.020 22.718*** -45.767 34.429*** 186.321
(2.693) (28.828) (2.421) (30.281) (6.364) (223.473)
Observations 191 191 167 167 183 183
R-squared 0.037 0.575 0.034 0.530 . .
FE year + state No Yes No Yes No Yes
State controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . . . . 0.000 0.0409
P-value Hansen test . . . . . .
Instrument for type I union activity: Percentage of full time employees
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3
Type I union activity  (ENS)
Dependant variable: Union members' homicide rate 
OLS LAGGED IV
26VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type II union activity -0.027** 0.035 -0.021** 0.057
(0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.051)
Type II union activity t-1 -0.145** 0.227
(0.066) (0.137)
Total homicide rate -0.605* -0.771** 0.015
(0.312) (0.366) (0.086)
GDP pc 4.483 13.617 2.093
(5.295) (9.016) (2.923)
Police arrests 1.369* 0.183 0.400
(0.737) (0.925) (0.621)
Guerrilla presence -1.369 0.218 -2.472
(1.181) (1.270) (3.796)
Paramilitary presence -7.067 -3.903 0.257
(9.512) (14.979) (9.112)
Union act*guerrilla presence -0.024 -0.014
(0.085) (0.105)
Union act*paramilitary presence 0.111 0.120
(0.175) (0.189)
Union act t-1*guerrilla presence -0.678
(0.452)
Union act t-1*paramilitary presence 0.382
(0.900)
Constant 24.140*** -21.534 24.994*** -24.504 13.459*** -16.393
(6.329) (33.860) (8.278) (38.299) (1.754) (18.015)
Observations 112 104 84 78 88 88
R-squared 0.009 0.741 0.008 0.834 . .
FE year + state No Yes No Yes No Yes
State controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . . . . 0.000 0.0134
P-value Hansen test . . . . 0.198 0.128
Instruments for type II union activity: Percentage of full time employees and social security payments per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4
Type II union activity ENS 
Dependant variable: Union members' homicide rate 
OLS LAGGED IV
27VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Type III union activity 0.035* -0.007 0.107*** 0.062
(0.020) (0.013) (0.038) (0.099)
Type III union activity t-1 0.000 0.005
(0.004) (0.021)
Total homicide rate 0.108 0.115 0.176
(0.148) (0.148) (0.117)
GDP pc -14.529** -2.192 -8.668
(5.942) (8.058) (17.518)
Police arrests 0.139 0.261 -0.083
(0.361) (0.338) (0.336)
Guerrilla presence 0.705 1.821 -0.469
(1.749) (2.330) (7.840)
Paramilitary presence 5.653 -3.133 7.608
(3.519) (4.050) (15.090)
Union act*guerrilla presence 0.005*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.017)
Union act*paramilitary presence 0.002 -0.013
(0.009) (0.058)
Union act t-1*guerrilla presence -0.003
(0.003)
Union act t-1*paramilitary presence 0.019
(0.012)
Constant 19.956*** 86.259*** 31.077*** 32.051 -2.169 50.771
(5.403) (33.003) (4.447) (40.261) (7.731) (91.976)
Observations 252 234 224 208 203 203
R-squared 0.177 0.682
FE year + state No Yes No Yes No Yes
State controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . . . . 0.003 0.044
P-value Hansen test . . . . . .
Instrument for type III union activity: Industrial energy consumption per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5
Type III union activity MPS 
Dependant variable: Union members' homicide rate 
OLS LAGGED IV
28First stages
Dependant variable: Union activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
% full time employees 1.701*** -0.689 0.653*** 1.124***
(0.211) (0.699) (0.176) (0.355)
Social security payments -4.923** -3.734
(1.980) (4.657)
Industrial energy consumption -0.197*** 0.107
(0.066) (0.267)
% full time employees*guerrilla presence -0.171** 0.084
(0.075) (0.275)
% full time employees*paramilitary presence 0.126 -0.794
(0.184) (0.929)
Social Security payments*guerrilla presence 0.000
(0.000)
Social Security payments*paramilitary presence 0.000
(0.000)
Ind. energy consumption*guerrilla presence 0.000
(0.000)
Ind. energy consumption*paramilitary presence -0.000**
(0.000)
Total homicide rate 0.031 -0.132 -0.484
(1.768) (0.713) (0.908)
GDP pc -342.692*** -20.180 -37.215
(80.037) (30.648) (37.952)
Police arrests 0.607 0.506 0.402
(5.447) (2.400) (2.185)
Guerrilla presence 30.174 -18.429 14.615
(28.037) (22.798) (12.415)
Paramilitary presence -113.755 52.841 32.982
(86.435) (65.856) (29.221)
Constant 2,379*** 7,353*** -1.993 -1,005.113*** 266.136*** 384.547
(140.341) (1,082.547) (25.993) (370.318) (22.915) (245.234)
Observations 183 183 88 88 203 203
R-squared 0.265 0.967 0.272 0.946 0.043 0.508
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6
Type I Type II Type III
29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Type I union activity 0.000 -0.014 -0.000 -0.012 0.001 -0.003 0.021 -0.014
(0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) (0.018) (0.018) (0.173)
Observations 191 183 191 183 191 183 191 183
R-squared 0.575 . 0.426 . 0.501 . 0.299 .
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0,041 . 0,041 . 0,041 . 0,041
P-value Hansen test . . . . . . . .
Type II union activity 0.008 0.026 -0.001 -0.004 0.009 0.019 -0.069 -0.353
(0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.040) (0.010) (0.031) (0.061) (0.477)
Observations 104 88 104 88 104 88 104 88
R-squared 0.765 . 0.735 . 0.512 0.489
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0,013 . 0,013 . 0,013 . 0,013
P-value Hansen test . 0.431 . 0.112 . 0,006 . 0.164
Type III union activity -0.002 -0.021 0.000 0.003 -0.012 0.011 -0.053 -0.564
(0.006) (0.044) (0.010) (0.070) (0.012) (0.057) (0.122) (0.631)
Observations 234 203 234 203 234 203 234 203
R-squared 0.575 0.575 0.478 0.324
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0.044 . 0.044 . 0.044 . 0.044
P-value Hansen test . . . . . . . .
Instrument for type I union activity: Percentage of full time employees
Instruments for type II union activity: Percentage of full time employees and social security payments per capita
Instrument for type III union activity: Industrial energy consumption per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7
ROBUSTNESS TESTS #1: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST UNION MEMBERS 








30Source of info. for VAUM 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV
Type I union activity 0,002 -0,004 0,000 -0,025
(0.003) (0.024) (0.003) (0.031)
Observations 191 183 191 183
R-squared 0,623 0,548
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0,041 . 0,041
P-value Hansen test .. . .
Type II union activity 0,028 0,021 0,007 0,022
(0.019) (0.035) (0.023) (0.048)
Observations 104 88 104 88
R-squared 0,581 0,794
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0,013 . 0,013
P-value Hansen test . 0,001 . 0,114
Type III union activity -0.027* -0,004 -0,002 -0,018
(0.015) (0.079) (0.012) (0.080)
Observations 234 203 234 203
R-squared 0,619 0,613 0,673 0,45
FE year + state Yes Yes Yes Yes
State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value F-excluded inst. . 0.044 . 0.044
P-value Hansen test .. . .
Instrument for type I union activity: Percentage of full time employees
Instruments for type II union activity: Percentage of full time employees and social security payments per capita
Instrument for type III union activity: Industrial energy consumption per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8
ROBUSTNESS TESTS #2: ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR VIOLENCE AGAINST UNION MEMBERS 
(VAUM) 
Dependant variable: Union members' homicide rate 
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